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ABSTRACT 
 
 Between 1951 until the mid-1970s Brazil went through a phase of intense economic 
growth and development of its industry. This study aims to study the period in which the military 
took power and became responsible for implementing these goals of economic development – 
which include the years between 1964 until 1983 – looking for the kind of resources that were 
used in order to achieve economic growth. This study argues that the kind of economic growth 
chosen by the military, which relied strongly on foreign loans from the Eurocurrency markets, 
reproduced a model of economic development that proved to be unsustainable. The fact that 
these funds were able to move freely with the incentive laws created by the military left the 
Brazilian internal market access to credit subject to changes in the international scenario.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Brazil went through a phase of intense industrial development and growth throughout the 
1950s until the mid-1970s. Throughout these decades government planning – specifically 
through the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning – in conjunction with investments 
from the public and private sector were able to build a relatively developed industrial sector, 
which diversified the Brazilian economy. According to Jeffry Frieden, despite having major gaps 
in its economic and political system, in the 1960s Brazil had one of the broadest economies 
among the developing countries
1
, which made the country less dependent on imports and also 
diversified its exports. It is extremely important to study this period in order to understand 
Brazilian authorities’ decisions regarding the funding model chosen for the industry during the 
second half of the twentieth century, and the reasons and the consequences of these decisions. 
This funding model, which was based on foreign loans and foreign direct investment, lasted from 
around 1956 until the end of the 1970s, which represented the moment of its exhaustion. Even 
though the model was already highly dependent on foreign resources since 1956, after the 1964 
military coup the authorities intensified the opening of the Brazilian market to foreign 
investment and borrowing. 
The first great expansion of what became known as the Eurocurrency markets occurred in 
the mid-1960s. During the 1960s there was an oversupply of the goods produced by United 
States, Japan and Germany, which led to a decline of the profit rates in the productive sector in 
these countries. The consequence of this movement was that these profits would have to go 
through a process of recycling. Because space for investment in the productive sector was 
                                                        
1
 Jeffry Frieden, “The Brazilian Borrowing Experience: From Miracle to Debacle and Back”, Latin 
American Research Review. Vol. 22 (1987): 97. 
    
 
 2 
restricted, the profits from this sector started to be invested in the financial sector – in the 
currency market that existed outside the borders of the US, but operated in US dollars. This 
marked the first expansion of the Eurocurrency markets, which happened before the 1970s oil 
crisis
2
. 
Eager to tap into this great liquidity of the international markets for its own development 
projects, the Brazilian military regime created a set of laws that would encourage the private 
companies to borrow and motivate the international banks to provide the loans to the companies 
established in the country. The Brazilian gross external debt increased from $ 3.2 billion in 1964 
to $ 17.1 billion in 1974. In 1978 it reached the figure of $ 43.5 billion. As Jeffry Frieden 
explains, foreign borrowing became crucial to the Brazilian economic and political development 
after 1967, when “virtually every major portion of the modern economy came to rely on foreign 
finance, as borrowed dollars funded everything from steel mills to soccer teams” 3 . The 
governmental rhetoric was that those funds were necessary to modernize the economy.  
When an international crisis emerged during the mid-1970s, private firms in the country 
decided to start a process of debt relief, and they decreased the pace of indebtedness with the 
international banks, gradually stopping to resort to this type of loan. The Brazilian government, 
however, decided that the country needed the foreign resources, and in order to maintain foreign 
borrowing, they created a set of measures to encourage the private companies to resort to the 
sources from abroad and increased the public companies’ borrowing. The problem, however, 
was that the private firms did not act as the government was expecting, and the public sector 
gradually had to increase its participation in the debt. The consequence of these measures was 
the rising indebtedness within the public sector, a process that became known as the 
                                                        
2 Fran ois  hesnais, “A Globaliza  o e o curso do capitalismo de fim-de-s culo”. Economia e Sociedade 
n.5 (1995): 19. 
3
 Frieden, “The Brazilian Borrowing Experience”, 95. 
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“nationalization of the debt”. In order to attract the external resources, the government took over 
the debt liabilities. 
The 1964 government plan to favor the private firms with the laws that it created brought 
development to the Brazilian industrial sector; yet, it did it at extreme costs. For a small period of 
time, the Brazilian industrial sector had all the resources available for its development and 
growth. However, when the international crisis became evident, the private sector started a 
process of debt relief, and the Brazilian government forced the public into borrowing. In addition 
to this, the US Federal Reserve Bank promoted an internal monetary policy that increased 
drastically US interest rates, which led to the increase of the world’s interest rates, and, 
consequently, to the increase of the Eurocurrency market interest rates. Because borrowing from 
the international banks was made at floating interest rates, the Brazilian external debt increased 
at catastrophic rates. At this moment, the state would find itself in a drastic international crisis, at 
the same time that other peripheral nations were declaring moratorium on the debt, and foreign 
credit was not available any longer.  
The Brazilian state entered the 1980s drowned in a foreign debt that had reached such 
numbers that the country would not be able to pay its services any longer – especially because at 
the time the foreign sources stopped offering credit, preventing the continuation of the debt 
rollover – unless the debt was renegotiated. The creditors came together and, under the 
intermediation and management of the International Monetary Fund, were able to renegotiate the 
debt with Brazil. Thus, the country was able to gradually pay the debt service, but at costs that 
deepened an economic crisis that would last for more than a decade. The country would only be 
able to completely recover from this crisis a quarter century later. 
    
 
 4 
One of the contributions of this work is that it complements the literature that discusses 
the foreign indebtedness during the military regime in Brazil. In comparison to Dívida Externa e 
Política Econômica by Davidoff Cruz, this work gives a step forward by providing different data 
from Banco Central do Brasil bulletins and reports, and examining studies that were not 
available at the time for Cruz
4, such as Monica Baer’s. In addition, considering that Cruz focuses 
on the analysis of the internal monetary policies during the 1970s, this work deepens the 
investigation of the international scenario conditions, which is briefly acknowledged in  ruz’s 
discussion, focusing on the explanation of the emergence of the Euromarkets and the changes in 
the international environment throughout the 1970s, and also on the austerity plans imposed by 
the IMF to indebted nations during the 1980s. By studying  ruz’s work under the light of 
scholarship developed in later years and the data collected from Banco Central do Brasil, this 
paper will assert that the opening of the Brazilian market to international funds from the 
Euromarkets stimulated the development of a model of economic growth that proved to be 
unsustainable. 
Between 1968 and 1973 it seemed that the foreign debt was generating economic growth, 
yet the following years showed that the debt-led growth – and the constant effort of the 
government in pushing for more indebtedness even though the private firms were not leaning 
towards borrowing any longer – was not worth the risk because it led to an economic crisis that 
could be prevented if these inflows were regulated by the state. When the international crisis 
escalated at the end of the 1970s and the borrowing of the private firms declined, the military had 
to take over the liabilities of the debt and make the public enterprises increase their loans with 
the international banks in order to try to push for economic growth. The debt-led model of 
growth depended on the international conditions. The fact that the authorities in Brazil decided to 
                                                        
4
 The first edition of  ruz’s book was published in 1984. 
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rely on this form of funding left the country’s economy vulnerable to external conditions, for any 
change in the international scenario could imply a decline in the foreign credit supply. And 
because the government did not plan for a decline in the credit supply, the Brazilian economy 
suffered drastically the consequences of a deep international economic crisis. 
Our goal is to examine the deepening of the Brazilian domestic market opening with the 
focus on the foreign borrowing that private and public companies situated in Brazil made from 
the Eurocurrency markets. In order to do so this work resorted to bibliography that had 
previously discussed the debt crisis and the period between 1964 and 1983. The studies of Paulo 
Davidoff Cruz, Claudia Guimarães, José Eduardo de Carvalho Pereira, Antônio Claudio 
Sochaczewski, Maria Lucia Lima, Thomas Skidmore, Jeffry Frieden, Fabio Antonio de Campos, 
Carlos Lessa and Monica Baer were examined and provided this work with background on the 
literature that was written about the progress of the Brazilian indebtedness under military rule. In 
addition, this work examined bulletins and reports from Banco Central do Brasil, which 
provided the data on the composition of the Brazilian foreign debt during the 1970s.  
First of all, it was crucial for this work to understand the emergence and growth of the 
Euromarkets. In Banking on the World, Frieden discusses the changes in the American finance 
system throughout the years, and the contribution of Frieden’s work for this study becomes 
evident when he examines the expansion of the Euromarkets and the involvement of the 
American banks in its growth. Frieden argues that in the aftermath of Second World War, the 
possibilities for a revival of private international finance were wider in Europe. In this 
environment the Eurocurrency markets emerged. The regulations of capital in the US imposed by 
the Kennedy administration pushed American banks to these unregulated Euromarkets. 
Strengthening their offshore branches, the American banks would be able to lend capital with 
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fewer restrictions. In other works quoted here, Frieden is also going to study the relationship of 
indebtedness between Brazil’s private and public sectors and the international banking system. 
The contribution of Maria Lucia Lima’s thesis to this work consists in her account of the 
emergence of the Eurocurrency markets. Her study examines the process of internationalization 
of private banking and how the grouping of these banks abroad converged in the formation of the 
Euromarkets. Both of these studies help us understand the conditions in which these markets 
were formed and that the capital that moved within them was looking for growth opportunities 
and potential markets to invest.  
The works of Guimarães, Sochaczewski, Pereira, Campos and Cruz discuss the 
implications of the changes in legislation that the military regime established, which were 
responsible for opening further the Brazilian internal market to external sources of credit. 
Guimarães’ dissertation discusses the changes in legislation that were institutionalized with 
PAEG (Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo). This author explains the effort of the 
military in modernizing the Brazilian funding system in order to enable the modernization and 
development of the economy, and especially industry. Guimarães’ work helps us understand that 
in order to promote economic growth, the government needed to develop new forms of credit 
creation and funding intermediation. In Desenvolvimento Econômico e Financeiro do Brasil, 
Sochaczewski’s effort is to explain the changes in the Brazilian economic and financial system 
from 1952 until 1968. For the purposes of the present study, Sochaczewski helps us understand 
the lagging of the Brazilian economic and financial apparatus and how it needed to be 
transformed in order to allow the economic changes envisioned by the military authorities. Both 
of these studies address specifically the first years of the military regime. 
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 ampos’ dissertation discusses the general movement of the foreign direct investment 
from the 1950s until 1990, arguing that the dominance of the foreign capital in the development 
of the Brazilian industry was harmful to the nation. For the author this process assured the 
continuance of the dependency and underdevelopment of the Brazilian economy. The importance 
of this work to the present study is that it provides the historical background for the process of 
internationalization of the Brazilian economy during the military dictatorship. Campos is one of 
the authors that studied the importance of the foreign firms borrowing from the Eurocurrency 
markets in the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. This author shows how the Brazilian 
government’s policies that allowed easy access to the international credit privileged these firms. 
In addition, Campos discusses the process of debt relief of the multinationals during the mid-
1970s, and the attempt and failure of the government in reversing this process by offering the 
Brazilian Central Bank to hedge their loans in order to secure them from currency devaluations. 
Jos  Eduardo de  arvalho Pereira’s study is different from the previous authors discussed 
in the sense that it was written in 1974, in the middle of the processes that this work discusses, 
and because it was written as a report for the Brazilian Institute of Economic and Social Planning 
(IPEA). Using reports from the Brazilian Central Bank, Pereira describes and analyses the 
participation of foreign credit in Brazilian economic growth during the period between 1966 and 
1973. This is one of the most valuable sources for this work, because it provides data for the 
period in which the Brazilian economy grew at most extraordinary rates. Pereira’s report helps us 
understand the importance of the measures created with PAEG in facilitating the entrance of 
private foreign capital in Brazil in the form of loans. It is important to understand this because 
when the economic crisis deepened in the 1980s and the Brazilian foreign debt exceeded a 
hundred billion dollars, it is crucial to know that this debt was held with private international 
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banks and that the Brazilian state would own the payment of the debt and its service to these 
private banks. 
Directly related and crucial for this study, is Davidoff  ruz’s works on the progress of 
Brazilian indebtedness during the 1970s and the process of nationalization of the debt in the mid 
1970s.                            conômica discusses the nature of the deficits in the current 
account and the relationship of these deficits with foreign borrowing. In this study the 
government’s rhetoric on the “gap of resources” is central for the author because it determined 
the impulse towards the expansion of borrowing with private foreign sources.  ruz’s article 
entitled Endividamento Externo e Transferência de Recursos Reais ao Exterior discusses deeper 
one of the periods that he had briefly discussed in his previous publication, which is the end of 
the 1970s and the time of the nationalization of the debt. This article is fundamental for our study 
because it draws a direct relationship between the nationalization of the debt and the crisis of the 
Brazilian state during the 1980s.  ruz’s article speaks directly to our thesis because it shows the 
infeasibility of the Brazilian government effort to push for indebtedness. 
 If Guimarães, Sochaczewski, and Pereira were crucial for understanding the measures 
implemented by the Castelo Branco economic team formed by Roberto Campos and Bulhões, 
 arlos Lessa’s work helped us understand the implementation of the Geisel economic plan, 
called II PND, and its consequences. Lessa describes Geisel’s effort in rearranging the 
government’s priorities towards industry and in making the production of equipment and 
machinery the leading sectors of the economy. The author also discusses the reasons for the 
failure of the plan, access to credit being one of them. 
 Thomas Skidmore contextualizes the economic and financial situation in Brazil with the 
political scenario in The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil. This work is important to understand 
    
 
 9 
the projects of the military for the Brazilian society. Within the idea of development and 
modernization of the national economy, Skidmore shows the “civilizing mission” that the 
military thought they were responsible for, and all the disagreements and conflicts that there 
were within the military. For the purposes of the present work, Skidmore’s book showed the 
environment in which the borrowing was made and the political decisions that influenced the 
economic and financial transformations in the country. 
 At last, this work discusses the ways in which the Brazilian government decided to 
handle the payment of the debt, and to argue about this subject this work relied greatly on 
Monica Baer’s study entitled O Rumo perdido: a crise fiscal e financeira do Estado Brasileiro. 
Baer argues that when the Brazilian authorities agreed to subject the fiscal and monetary policies 
to meet specific targets set by the IMF, the nation lost control of how it could manage the crisis. 
For this work, Baer’s description of how the IMF was allied with the international private banks 
is essential. As the author explains, the IMF was the manager of the crisis, and it served as the 
advocate of the foreign banks. 
 The study of these works and the data found Banco do Brasil’s bulletins and reports will, 
therefore, help us understand the explanations and consequences of this moment of Brazilian 
indebtedness with the Eurocurrency markets. In the first chapter this work will analyze the 
emergence of the Euromarkets and the eagerness of the military to have access to these funds. In 
the second chapter this work will focus on the study of the period of greatest economic growth in 
Brazil, the influence of the foreign funds in this growth and which were the economic sectors 
mostly responsible for indebtedness from 1968 until 1973. At last, this work will evaluate the 
consequences of a decade of intense borrowing with private international banks for Brazil, and 
how the country’s authorities handled the crisis in the beginning of the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CLIMATE AND THE MILITARY RESPONSES 
TO THE 1960S CRISIS 
 
The João Goulart government faced a period of intense economic and political crisis in 
the beginning of the 1960s. Economically, the government was challenged with an increasing 
inflation and deficit in the Balance of Payments, and in the political sphere, opposing strata of 
the society demanded different actions from the state. Pressured by the progressive political 
parties, unions, rural movements, and students, the Goulart government started to fight for 
capital regulation, basic reforms
5
, and the enlargement of social rights. Because the majority in 
congress did not approve of the Goulart reforms, he started to induce rallies to motivate the 
population’s participation in order to pressure the Congress6. 
The opposition, however, would not allow Goulart reforms to come into effect. The 
conservative strata of the Brazilian society that were against these projects that tended to 
promote policies of capitalism regulation, and that were formed by bankers, businessmen and big 
landowners, joined the military in the promotion of a coup in order to prevent the Goulart 
government from implementing its projects
7
. The dictatorship narrowed down the possibility of 
change and put into effect the modernizing project for Brazil that was defended by the 
conservatives. New legislation and a change in the international sources of funding would enable 
the model of development desired by this group to come into effect. 
                                                        
5
 These reforms varied from agricultural land reform, to the creation of public schools, and the elevation 
of basic wages. 
6
 Thomas Skidmore, Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988), 15. 
7
 João Manuel Cardoso de Mello and Fernando Novais, Capitalismo Tardio e Sociabilidade Moderna, 
 S o Paulo: Editora  NESP,    9 , 5 . 
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1.1 The Eurocurrency Markets and their interest in Brazil and Latin America 
In order to understand how the project of development planned by the military came into 
effect, it is crucial to briefly look into the emergence of the Eurocurrency markets. This market 
that arose during the 1960s as a new international financial concept was defined as a space that 
held currency outside its country of issue
8
, and represented the source of the international funds 
responsible for the increase of the Brazilian foreign debt during the 1960s and the 1970s. 
 Jeffry Frieden argues that American international finance was relatively inactive during 
the 1930s and 1940s
9
. After the 1950s and the reconstruction of Europe in the aftermath of 
Second World War, the possibilities for a revival of private international finance were wider, and 
in the 1960s it took a turn toward the offshore markets, also known as Eurocurrency markets or 
Euromarkets. As Frieden claims, “soon hundreds of billions of dollars were flowing 
untrammeled across borders with a speed and fluidity that even America’s most optimistic 
international bankers could not have imagined in the 19  s and 194 s”10. 
 The Euromarkets emerged during the 1950s as the result of the Soviet Union’s and 
 hina’s deposits. Afraid the American government would seize their capital if sent to the United 
States, instead of depositing the profits earned from the international trade in the US, these 
countries deposited them in the banks that were operating in the Euromarkets
11
. Later during the 
1960s, the Euromarkets’ high interest rates attracted other depositors, such as the American 
corporations with subsidiaries in Europe that aimed to earn a better return on their dollars than 
they could in the United States. Because there was a crisis of oversupply of goods in the 
productive sphere, the companies started to “recycle” their profits in the sphere of international 
                                                        
8
 Jeffry Frieden, Banking on the World: the politics of American international finance (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1988), 82. 
9
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 51. 
10
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 77. 
11
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 81. 
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finance. Instead of reinvesting the profits in production they would invest this capital in the 
international banks. For François Chesnais this was the main element of expansion of the 
Eurocurrency markets, which brought an abrupt increase of the capital circulating in these 
markets already in the 1960s
12
. 
Meanwhile, in the United States, American lending to foreigners grew rapidly and the 
outflow of dollars out of the US increased drastically. Robert Bremner states that from 1956 until 
1961 “a total of $17 billion of  S long and short-term private capital went abroad”, and that 
during 1960 and 1961 the US registered an outflow of capital of an average of $3.9 billion and 
an average of only $1.3 billion of capital inflows
13
. To prevent the continuity of this drainage of 
capital, the Kennedy administration imposed a change in Regulation Q establishing a tax on most 
foreign bonds issued in the US, and limiting the amount that banks in the US could lend to 
foreigners and that American corporations could send abroad to invest. Also, a measure that was 
called “Operation Twist”, and that was greatly pursued during Kennedy’s administration, 
consisted of determining a monetary policy that would “keep domestic long-term interest rates 
low while moving shorter term interest rates higher to minimize short-term capital outflows”14. 
These regulations, however, instead of preventing American banks and corporations from 
sending dollars overseas sped the internationalization of American finance. They pushed 
American banks to the unregulated Euromarkets
15
. American banks strengthened their branches 
in Europe to attract dollar deposits and lend them there. About this, Jeffry Frieden concludes that 
the offshore dollar lending exploded as a response to restrictions on foreign lending in the US, 
                                                        
12  hesnais, “A Globaliza  o e o curso do capitalismo”, 19. 
13
 Robert Bremner, Chairman of the Fed: William McChesney Martin Jr. and the creation of the modern 
American financial System (London: Yale University Press, 2004), 166. 
14
 Karel Hobik, “ nited States Balance of Payments Deficit and Monetary Policy”. Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, Bd 103 (1969): 172. 
15
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 84. 
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implying that American banks were the main institutions responsible for the growth of the 
Eurocurrency markets during the 1960s. 
A crucial characteristic of this international finance is its relative freedom from national 
government interference. The Euromarkets created an international financial circuit that had its 
own characteristics and high rates of autonomy when compared to the national financial 
markets
16
. As Frieden states, the lending process before the advent of the Euromarkets was to a 
great extent a part of national economies
17
. However, in the Euromarket, investors, borrowers, 
and banks were tied in a network that was part of no national financial system and, at the same 
time, part of them all. Because the banks in the offshore markets were usually free from national 
regulations, they could charge less to the borrowers and use the latest financial innovations, for 
example – without securing their governments approval beforehand. As Frieden interprets, “the 
combination of state-of-the-art technology and relative freedom from government interference 
makes the offshore markets the financial marketplace of choice for the world’s leading banks and 
corporations”18. 
Despite the great expansion of these markets, during the 1950s and in the beginning of 
the 1960s the offshore banks were not yet interested in lending to Brazil. Up until 1968, the 
international banks found it too risky to invest in an economy that had very low rates of growth. 
Because they were looking for opportunities that would provide them with high rates of profit, 
Brazil was not an option, yet. As this work will show in the next chapter, this scenario would 
change in 1968. 
 
                                                        
16 Maria Lucia L. M. P. Lima, “O Euromercado e a Expans o do  apital Financeiro Internacional” 
(Masters thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 1985), 63. 
17
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 90. 
18
 Frieden, Banking on the World, 91. 
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1.2 Financial Reforms 
In order to establish in Brazil the development model that was envisioned by the military 
elites, the government created new forms of credit creation and funding intermediation. The idea 
was to give the firms in the country access to internal and external sources of credit. Already 
aware of what was happening in the offshore markets and eager to tap into this great liquidity, 
the Brazilian military government proposed a plan to attract foreign investments to the country 
and to prepare the Brazilian financial internal market for receiving these funds. Already in 1964 
the Brazilian government institutionalized the Programa de Ação Econômica do Governo, 
PAEG. 
PAEG’s guidelines proposed that this plan would be committed to fighting inflation and 
correcting the distortions in the systems of price, in speeding up the modernization of the social 
and economic structure of the country, and with long-term planning. Its main goals were to 
reduce inflation, to enforce the economic growth that was interrupted in 1962, to alleviate 
sectorial and regional imbalances and tensions created by social inequality, to assure productive 
employment, and to restore the viability of the Balance of Payments
19
.  
From 1964 until 1966, 848 laws, 5685 decrees, 3 institutional acts, 24 complementary 
acts, 58 memorandums from the Central Bank, and 41 Resolutions, among other measures, were 
established
20
. Some of these measures will be discussed here because they represented the legal 
instruments responsible for connecting the Brazilian internal market to the foreign resources. 
Before advancing further with the analysis of the legal measures that facilitated borrowing from 
the Euromarkets, it is important to state here that the Brazilian government was willing to attract 
                                                        
19
 Mario Henrique Simonsen, and Roberto de Oliveira Campos, A Nova Economia Brasileira (Rio de 
Janeiro: José Olympio, 1975), 61. 
20
 Antonio Claudio Sochaczewski, Desenvolvimento Econômico e Financeiro do Brasil 1952–1968  S o 
Paulo: Trajet ria  ultural, 199  ,   5. 
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several forms of foreign investment, such as foreign direct investments, and even suppliers’ 
credits. However, this work is going to focus specifically on foreign loans, the measures that 
facilitated their entrance in Brazil and the consequences of their massive inflows
21
. 
The first legal change to be analyzed here is the one introduced in 1964 by Law 4.390 
that presented a shift in Law 4.131, enacted by João Goulart in 1962. The Goulart government 
was facing a problem of increased profit remittances, which in 1960 reached the value of $646 
million
22
. This represented a problem to the government because the profits were being sent to 
the multinationals headquarters instead of being reinvested in the Brazilian economy. In order to 
control these remittances, Goulart created Law 4.131, which established that no more than 10 
percent of the profits originated from the initial capital that was invested could be remitted, and 
forbade the subsidiary firms to remit to their headquarters the profits that arose from 
reinvestments
23
. In addition, Law 4.131 would regulate the influx of all foreign capital that 
would enter the country and the total of the international financial transactions
24
. 
With the advent of Law 4.390 the limits to profit remittances were loosened. The most 
important changes that came with Law 4.390 were the revocation of articles 31, 32 and 33 from 
Law 4.131. In summary, the three articles determined that the value of profit remittances could 
not exceed 10 percent of the value of the initial investments, and that the foreign capital portion 
of annual return could not exceed 12 percent of the registered capital
25
. This change approved 
that an aliquot of twelve percent of all the capital invested – the initial capital and also the one 
                                                        
21
 For further information about the study of foreign direct investment in Brazil see Fabio Antonio de 
 ampos, “A Arte da Conquista: o capital internacional no desenvolvimento capitalista brasileiro (1951- 
199  ”  Ph.D. diss.,  niversidade Estadual de  ampinas,    9 . 
22
 Sochaczewski,                                       , 166. 
23
  ampos, “A Arte da  onquista”, 14 . 
24
 José Eduardo de Carvalho Pereira,                                                                  
(Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/ INPES, 1974), 19. 
25
 (Banco Central do Brasil, Lei 4.131) 
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that was product of the reinvestments – could be remitted to the headquarters. Despite still 
imposing a limit to profit remittances, this law did not put a limit on the payment of interest rates 
and amortization from foreign loans
26
. The net result of this change was that the foreign firms 
were encouraged to invest in Brazil because they would be able to remit a higher value of profits 
than they had being remitting during the previous governments. In addition, even though there 
was a limit in the value that they could remit, they could forward the profits to the headquarters 
by claiming they were paying interest rates and amortization from foreign loans. Therefore, the 
multinationals could remit more than the twelve percent of all the capital invested by declaring 
they were not profit remittances, but payment for the service of the debt.  
The motivation of the military government was that Law 4.390 would stimulate a rapid 
increase in private foreign investment that would bring technology and improve the balance of 
payments. The Brazilian Veja magazine stated in 1969 that the intention of the Brazilian 
government economic team in changing the law that regulated profit remittances was to provide 
an attractive environment for the foreign capital
27
. In addition, the dictatorship also believed that 
the fact that they were benefiting foreign investors in Brazil would help them to convince the US 
government and the international agencies that Brazil was committed to the free world 
economy
28
. Therefore, the law was also a symbolic gesture from the military regime. Law 4.390 
served as a booster for foreign loans. For Frieden, it tended to favor foreign companies and 
public enterprises because they had “preferential access to the Euromarkets due to the size and 
creditworthiness of the ultimate guarantor of the loan” – which were the headquarters, in the case 
of the multinationals, and the Brazilian government, in the case of the parastatals
29
. This would 
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already indicate which would be the firms that contracted most of the debt throughout the end of 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
Another measure, Instruction 289 introduced in 1965, allowed industrial or commercial 
firms in the country to borrow directly from external banks. It was created in order to increase 
the supply of working capital to the firms in Brazil. Pereira claims that Instruction 289 was 
shaped to substitute for swap loans because “difficulties in the balance of payments reduced 
companies’ capacity to import, which led the monetary authorities to allow the short-term 
inflows of foreign currency”30. This measure made it possible for the                ’  foreign 
exchange portfolio (or Carteira de Câmbio do Banco do Brasil) to purchase foreign currency; 
establishing for the seller the right to a currency hedging to the foreign currency return. The 
benefits that this law gave to the multinationals were explained by the direct and simplified 
intermediation of the subsidiary to access foreign loans with the international banks
31
.   
The PAEG also created Law 4.728. One of the functions of this law was to give the 
investment banks the responsibility to supply long-term credit in order to provide the financial 
system with more agile forms of fund raising. This would be an essential measure when it came 
to the entrance of the funds from the Euromarkets in the country. These investment banks would 
become responsible for one of the forms of intermediation between the international banks and 
the firms that got the loans
32
. More than being responsible for long-term credit supply, they 
ended up becoming great sources of working capital to firms, and intermediaries of public and 
external funds
33
. 
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In addition, Law 4.728 allowed the financial institutions to pay the value of the monetary 
correction to their shareholders above the interest rates agreed upon, in order to prevent inflation 
from jeopardizing the appreciation of public bonds. Because the idea was to fight and end 
inflation, this measure would be provisional and would be abolished proportionally to the 
decrease of inflation rates
34
. Even though inflation decreased from 90 percent in 1964 to 39 
percent in 1966, it was not quelled. When the Brazilian economy started to grow in 1968 this 
monetary correction prevailed, and inflation became an instrument of speculation. In other 
words, the shareholders started to bet on the appreciation of their bonds based on the increase of 
inflation, and because the short-term gains that originated with this were too great, the agents 
were not willing to wait for long-term gains that could come through the stock markets. This 
jeopardized the growth of the stock market and the capital market activities in Brazil
35
. 
As Skidmore explains, the lack of a central bank was a major institutional gap in the 
Brazilian economic system
36
. The institutions that were meant to fulfill the functions of the 
central bank were Banco do Brasil, and Superintendência da Moeda e do Crédito (SUMOC). 
While the first used to be the lender to the public sector – and at the same time functioned as a 
commercial bank – the second was the agency that coordinated monetary policy. In 1965 the 
military created the Central Bank (BACEN) and the Conselho Monetário Nacional (CMN) 
aiming to centralize monetary policy
37
. Even though it took several years for the BACEN to 
concentrate power, because the Banco do Brasil continued to influence monetary policy, the 
creation of a central bank would be of extreme importance, for all the problems regarding 
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reserves and balance of payments deficit that reappeared during the 1970s would start to be 
handled by this bank.  
In addition, of extreme importance to the purposes of this work was the creation of 
Resolution 63 in 1967. Through this resolution investment or private development banks, and 
commercial banks that were authorized to function in foreign exchange, would be able to 
contract foreign loans that would be passed directly to enterprises in the country
38
. It allowed the 
foreign capital to be transferred by the investment banks, commercial banks, and by the BNDE 
(Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico
39
), sanctioning a direct financial 
intermediation between private enterprises in Brazil and the international credit market
40
. 
In order to complement all these measures created to stimulate the entrance of foreign 
funds in the country, the military government signed a treaty with the  nited States’ government 
in which the Brazilian authorities were committed to compensating “justly” any expropriations 
of American-owned property that were invested in Brazil. If there were litigation on the value of 
the property, the decision would go to US courts (Sochaczewski, 1993, p. 241). 
This revised legislation connected the interests of the multinationals and dominant classes 
to the foreign funds available at the Euromarkets. With this new legislation the industrial projects 
of the dominant classes would be able to be funded and come into effect – because the domestic 
funds would not be enough to achieve the desired goals to the Brazilian industry. New 
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possibilities of funding were given to the private, and also public, firms in the country, which 
would be able to access the international banking system more easily. 
Although these measures started to be set up in 1964, it was not until 1968 that the 
Brazilian internal market started to attract external resources effectively. Up until the end of this 
decade the external investor did not want to risk his funds in an economy that was still 
registering low growth rates. The expectations for profit rates and domestic market development 
were still low, and at this moment it did not matter how the Brazilian government was treating 
the foreign investor (Sochaczewski, 1993, p. 244). As Skidmore states, “business was looking for 
the prospect of economic growth, which alone could generate profits”, and in mid-1965, it was 
not clear weather the PAEG could achieve growth soon, “so private foreign investors remained 
cautious”41.  
Nevertheless, the reforms established by the Program were of extreme importance 
because they created a favorable environment for foreign investments and funds. The PAEG 
opened the Brazilian market as never before. The Brazilian military government chose debt-led 
growth and allowed the corporations and firms in the country to grow and implement their 
modernizing projects with foreign capital. As Frieden claimed, “the Brazilian government, along 
with the private financial sector and the largest basic industrial firms, did everything possible to 
tap the expanding international financial markets”42. Even though this represented a promising 
project that would, and did, allow the modernization of the Brazilian industrial park, as this work 
will show, its consequences were devastating for the country. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FOREIGN LOANS AND DEBT-LED GROWTH 
 
 In 1966 foreign creditors operating through the Eurocurrency markets started to believe 
Brazil was “on the eve of a resurgence of growth”, an impression they got especially because of 
the reduction of inflation. Skidmore stated that in December 1965 the US government announced 
another $150 million loan to be implemented through the USAID program, and “in February 
1966, the IMF and the US reiterated their confidence with new financial commitments”43. But it 
is important to notice here that up until 1967 Brazil had been borrowing mainly from foreign 
state agencies, and especially from the US government. Only after the Brazilian economy started 
to show real economic prospective growth would the private foreign investor restore his interest 
in the country. And this was what happened during 1967 and 1968, when after four years of 
economic recession Brazil recovered from the economic crisis, and its global growth rates 
reached 4.8 percent in 1967 and 11.2 percent in 1968
44
. During the period between 1968 and 
1974 the Brazilian gross domestic product grew an average rate of 9 percent a year
45
. 
 Tavares and Assis argue that the conditions in which the Brazilian “economic miracle” 
would manifest itself were the production of durable consumer goods and the real estate market 
recovery that urged economic growth. In addition, even though the wages paid to a growing 
number of employees were low, they stimulated the demand for consumer goods
46
. In another 
article, Tavares, together with Belluzzo, summarily attributes the recovery of Brazilian industry 
to the fiscal and financial reforms of 1966 that improved the funding conditions; to the increase 
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and restructuring of the prices of public utilities that encouraged the power transmission project; 
to the consumer credit program linked to the monetary adjustment, which encouraged the 
demand of several durable consumer goods; to the program of house loans (or Sistema 
Financeiro de Habitação) that encouraged civil construction; to the incentives to exports that 
involved subsidies to the textile production and machinery; and to the wage and funding policies 
that motivated the consumption of the upper-middle class. For these authors, all these policies 
had great impact on employment and on the increase of urban income
47
. 
 Lessa claims that during the period between 1966 and 1969, the industry of capital goods 
in Brazil grew an average of 7.5 percent a year, and between 1970 and 1973, it grew an average 
of 27 percent a year. The industry of durable consumer goods, in its turn, grew an average of 
16.2 percent between 1966 and 1969, and 18.4 percent between 1970 and 1973. In addition, the 
industry of non-durable goods grew 8.4 between 1966 and 1969, and 7.2 percent between 1970 
and 1973. Finally, intermediate goods grew 9.5 percent between 1966 and 1969, and 11.4 
percent between 1970 and 1973
48
. In this scenario of industrial economic progress, foreign loans 
would be greatly responsible for providing the funds that would give rise and safeguard this 
growth. Frieden claims that this industrial expansion was greatly financed by borrowing. He 
argues that “some of the expansion was financed by new injections of equity from local affiliates 
of foreign corporations, but even for foreign-owned corporations, borrowing abroad was often 
more attractive than direct investment by the home office”49.  
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The new investment programs of the state companies relied on loans that came from 
overseas “in almost every case”50. One example that illustrates this point is the energy sector in 
Brazil. Only about 30 percent of the investment funds to finance Eletrobrás, Itaipú and 
Nuclebrás came from net operating income. According to Frieden, “by the late 197 s, half of all 
investment was being financed by borrowing, almost all of it abroad”51. 
 
2.1 Foreign Debt Increase and The Economic “Miracle” 
 In 1967, the administration of the federal government and the economic planning were 
changed. When Costa e Silva took office in 1967, Delfim Neto, a 38-year old economist from the 
city of São Paulo, substituted for Roberto Campos and Octávio Bulhões. The decisive aspect of 
this new administration for this study is that Delfim Neto changed the diagnosis of the cause of 
Brazilian inflation. If in 1964 the authorities claimed the Brazilian inflation was demand-
induced, which was triggered by public sector deficits, excessive credit to the private sector and 
excessive wage increases, now, Delfim Neto argued that it was cost-push inflation. Here he 
claimed that the most important cost was credit, which was “further tightened in 1966-1967”52. 
Consequently, if the diagnosis were different, the prescription to end inflation would also be 
another one.  
Delfim’s plan to fight inflation stated that an increase in the goods’ supply would be 
necessary in order for the demand to be matched, which would come through a expansionary 
monetary policy. The idea was to “stimulate demand by easing credit”53. According to Delfim, 
the economic team intended to speed up the development process encouraging the private sector, 
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while the government would perform a supporting role. The measures “aimed to strengthen the 
stock market and, consequently, the private enterprises”54. The government started to increase 
credit to the companies, releasing loans to the private sector, to control prices, especially the 
financial costs and input, and to stimulate demand in the sectors where the excess capacity was 
larger
55. This indicates that the government’s orientation was to inject liquidity into the Brazilian 
economy. 
 The domestic credit expansion would come together with an increase in the foreign 
currency inflows around 1968. This would favor Delfim’s plan, for the domestic institutions 
would be able to intermediate the borrowing between the international banks and the firms 
located in Brazil. The period between 1968 and 1973 would be characterized by the massive 
inflows of foreign resources to Brazil; a moment when the Euromarkets started to target Latin 
America and provide credit to underdeveloped countries that had good potential for expansion. 
The determinant characteristic of this period was this broader movement of the international 
capital that was benefiting Brazil, as all of Latin America, by seeing in the region a growt 
opportunity
56
. This suggests that even though the military created measures to attract the 
international loans, the foreign creditors would have been willing to lend to Brazil even if the 
internal Brazilian legislation was not that favorable. Yet, the measures had been created, and, 
now, the international capital would start to use them to enter the country. An increase in 
borrowing from private international banks by firms is Brazil was established especially through 
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Law 4.131, Resolution 63 and Instruction 289
57
. The reforms implanted by PAEG provided the 
institutional bases to the phase of growth that would mark the years between 1968 and 1973. 
 Some characteristics of this phase of the military government show that the country’s 
economic growth during this period was greatly due to the expansionary monetary policy, and 
was not aided by other governmental policies. Delfim Neto centralized the control of taxes 
entirely in the federal government. His fiscal policy reduced in half the resource transfers to the 
states and counties. In addition, the domestic capital markets did not develop on solid 
foundations due to the competition from loan capital and the expansion of the finance market. As 
Tavares and Assis stated, the Brazilian economy during this period was driven dependent on 
“public funds, bureaucratic favors, and credit”58.  
 It is also necessary to discuss here the military government’s motivations to attract 
foreign loans. The massive support to the foreign indebtedness was emphasized by the official 
rhetoric by the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. The official discourse claimed that 
the foreign loans were a vital element to the viability of the high growth rates of the domestic 
product, for if Brazil tried to speed up its growth rates it would face restrictions on the external 
sector performance and on the internal savings. The rhetoric stated that there was a domestic 
“gap of resources”  or “hiato de recursos”  that would restrict economic growth. Foreign 
borrowing was, therefore, necessary for economic growth and the alternative to the absence of 
significant internal savings
59
. 
 The other problem seen by the government was that these foreign loans were also 
necessary to bring equilibrium to the Brazilian Balance of Payments. The data of the Current 
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Account shows that from 1969 until 1973 imports increased. However, exports also increased, 
and they were able to guarantee the necessary reserves to balance the Current Account. From 
1969 until 1973 the trade balance of the Current Account registered a deficit of only $30 
million
60
. In addition, foreign direct investment also increased during this period. Together, the 
exports and the FDI were able to bring equilibrium to the Balance of Payments. Therefore, the 
rhetoric of the “gap of resources” was invalid for this period.  
 The consequence of the borrowing at this period was an incredible increase of the 
Brazilian international reserves, which was criticized by Brazilian economists in 1973. Luiz 
Gonzaga Belluzzo, from Universidade de Campinas, asserted that there were no motives to think 
of the entrance of foreign capital as a formula for complementing domestic savings. For him the 
factor that determined how much would be invested was not the previous volume of savings, but 
the decision of the firms that would have new savings once profits materialized. Edmar Lisboa 
Bacha, from Universidade de Brasília, also said that these high volumes of reserves did not allow 
an increase in the imports of capital goods in the same proportion that the dollars were entering 
Brazil, asserting that for him that this was not an efficient way of promoting development
61
. 
Meanwhile, Delfim Neto continued arguing that “when more resources are brought from abroad 
they allow a larger investment, the same level of consumption is maintained and the economy is 
accelerated”62.  
 
2.2 Composition of the Debt 
By the end of the 1960s the international movement of capital favored Latin America, 
and the Brazilian economy was one of the targets of the international financial capital that was 
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looking for opportunities of appreciation in markets of potential growth
63
. Data found in Banco 
         ’  bulletins show that Law 4.131 – changed by Law 4.390 – and Resolution 63 were the 
two most important laws in the composition of the debt between 1969 and 1978. Table 1 shows 
how important was the creation of those laws, for the majority of the borrowing that was 
contracted from institutions in Brazil during the 1970s entered the country through Law 4.131 
and Resolution 63. By the end of the 1960s Instruction 289 was also relevant in the composition 
of the debt; however, this law was revoked in 1972. 
In 1969 the loans that entered the country through Law 4131 and Resolution 63 
represented, respectively, 18.1 percent and 9.8 percent of the total debt. In 1974 these amounts 
increased to 45.5 percent and 19.3 percent, respectively. In 1975 loans in currency already 
represented 68.7 percent in the total debt. Table 1 shows that within the 1970s the loans in 
currency account increased its participation in the total debt and became responsible, at the end 
of the 1978, for almost 68 percent of the total debt in Brazil. By the end of 1969, most of the debt 
was divided between import financing and loans in currency, that, respectively, held 30.9 percent 
and 36.4 percent at this time. By 1971, loans in currency were already responsible for 48.3 
percent of the debt, while in 1973 this value was worth 62.4 percent. In 1976 this value reached 
its peak, when 70 percent of the debt was derived from this category. 
Within the category loans in currency, table 1 also shows that the categories in which 
most of the debt was held were Law 4.131 and Resolution 63. The increase of loans that 
originated from Law 4.131 was the most dramatic. In nine years the debt contracted via this law 
increased from $ 798.7 million to $ 22 billion, an increase of 2,775 percent. In what concerns 
Resolution 63, the increase of the debt via this category was also considerable. While in 1969 
loans originated from this resolution were worth $ 432.5 million and represented 9.8 percent of 
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the debt, in 1974 this value was accumulated on almost $ 3 billion and a half, representing 19.3 
percent of the total debt. From 1975 to 1978 the value of the debt contracted by this resolution 
continued increasing from $ 3.7 billion in 1975 to over $ 7 billion in 1978, yet the representation 
of this category in the total debt dropped slightly and settled in an average of 17 percent 
throughout these years. 
Regarding the loans originated by Instruction 289, the data show a decline of loans 
originated by this category. By 1969, 8.5 percent of the Brazilian total debt was derived from this 
category, in 1972 the amount of the debt held by this category was worth 2.2 percent of the debt, 
and after 1973 the debt acquired by this law suffered a drastic decline, falling to 0.5 percent of 
the total debt in 1973 and 0.2 percent 1975. The main reason for this declined was that 
Instruction 289 was revoked in 1972
64
. 
The analysis of this data helps us to understand the characteristics of the Brazilian 
increasing debt. The type of borrowing that was mostly causing the increase of the total debt was 
the kind that was entering the country through Law 4.131 and Resolution 63. These data show 
the greater increase of the debt that was contracted from international private banks
65
; it indicates 
that throughout the 1970s the proportions of the increase of the debt in these categories were 
much higher than in the other categories. While the Banco Central registered an increase from $ 
1.7 billion in 1970 to $ 6.5 billion in import financing category, in loans in currency category this 
increase went from $ 2.2 billion in 1970 to $ 18 billion in 1976.  
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Table 1: Brazilian External Debt ($ million) 
 
Source: Pereira, 1974, p. 93; Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, maio 1979, p. 214, 215.  
    
 
 
 
 
  1969 1970 1971 1972      1973   
  Value  % Value % Value % Value % Value  % 
1 - Compensatory Loans 548.4 12.4 381.8 7.2 300.6 4.5 240.9 2.5 203.3 1.6 
2 - USAID - Program Loans 564.8 12.8 603.6 11.4 622.8 9.4 617.8 6.5 614.5 4.8 
3 - Imports Financing 1355.2 30.9 1709.3 32.2 2201.5 33.3 2783.8 29.2 3486.8 27.7 
3.1 - International Entities 363.9 8.3 456 8.6 576.2 8.7 762.1 8 971.8 7.7 
World Bank 198.8 4.5 258.2 4.6 347.5 5.2 483.9 8 646.9 5.1 
Interamerican Development Bank 151 3.5 181.4 3.4 206.1 3.1 243.7 2.6 277.1 2.2 
International Finance Corporation 14.1 0.3 16.4 0.3 22.6 0.3 34.5 0.4 47.8 0.3 
3.2 - Government Agencies 543.9 12.4 642.5 12.1 780.2 11.8 886 9.3 1072.8 8.5 
3.3 - Other 447.4 10.2 610.8 11.5 845.2 12.8 1135.7 11.8 1442.2 11.4 
4 - Consolidated Public Debt 16.1 0.4 15 0.3 13.9 0.2 12.2 0.1 10.4 0.08 
5 - Loans in Currency 1604.7 36.4 2284.6 43.1 3193 48.2 5528.3 58.2 7848.5 62.4 
5.1 - Resolução 63, of August 21, 
1967 432.5 9.8 653.2 12.3 983.3 14.8 2018.4 21.2 2398.1 19 
5.2 - Instrução 289, of January 14, 
1965 373.5 8.5 381.2 7.2 294.8 4.5 207.4 2.2 71.1 0.5 
5.3 - Lei 4.131, of September 3, 
1962 798.7 18.1 1250.2 23.6 1914.9 28.9 3302.5 34.7 5379.3 42.7 
6 - Other Loans 314.1 7.1 301.2 5.7 289.8 4.4 278 2.9 265.8 2.1 
7 - Grand Total 4403.3 100 5295.2 100 6621.5 100 9521 100 12571.5 100 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
       1974        1975        1976        1977         1978   
  Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
1 - Compensatory Loans 168.6 0.9 137.4 0.6 106.2 0.4 75 0.2 43.8 0.1 
2 - USAID - Program Loans 610.4 3.5 600.5 2.8 585.8 2.2 569.8 1.7 551.4 1.2 
3 - Imports Financing 4741.3 27.6 5464 25.8 6577.6 25.3 8422.3 26.2 10829.8 24.8 
3.1 - International Entities 1388.4 8 1654.8 7.8 1993.3 7.6 2355.2 7.3 2885.3 6.6 
World Bank 978.1 5.6 1094 5.1 1287 4.9 1540.4 4.8 1974 4.5 
Interamerican Development Bank 311.7 1.8 416.3 1.9 545.9 2.1 624 1.9 731.2 1.6 
International Finance 
Corporation 98.5 0.5 144.5 0.6 160.4 0.6 190.8 0.5 180.1 0.4 
3.2 - Government Agencies 1541 8.9 1829.5 8.6 2170.4 8.3 2294.3 7.1 2601.7 5.9 
3.3 - Other 1812 10.5 1979.7 9.3 2413.9 9.2 3772.8 11.7 5342.8 12.2 
4 - Consolidated Public Debt 9.4 0.05 7.3 0.03 5.4 0.02 4.7 0.01 4.7 0.01 
5 - Loans in Currency 11210.7 65.3 14561.1 68.7 18194 70 21528.4 67.1 29499.7 67.7 
5.1 - Resolução 63, of August 21, 
1967 3319.1 19.3 3734 17.6 4715.4 18.1 5239.8 16.3 7272.4 16.7 
5.2 - Instrução 289, of January 
14, 1965 68.9 0.4 46.1 0.2 40.9 0.1 26.8 0.08 27 0.06 
5.3 - Lei 4.131, of September 3, 
1962 7822.7 45.5 10781 50.9 13437.7 51.7 16261.8 50.7 22200.3 51 
6 - Other Loans 253.2 1.4 240.3 1.1 227.7 0.8 214.6 0.6 201 0.4 
7 - Grand Total 17165.7 100 21171.4 100 25985.4 100 32037.2 100 43510.7 100 
 
Source: Pereira, 1974, p. 93; Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, maio 1979, p. 214, 215.  
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The following diagram 1 shows two pie charts that reveal the percentages of the most 
important loan categories in the Brazilian debt account. These charts show that in 1969, the year 
that marked the beginning of the Brazilian “Economic Miracle”, the composition of the debt was 
relatively well distributed between loans in currency, imports financing and other loans. 
However, the 1975 chart shows that this composition was abruptly changed in the first half of the 
1970s. In 1975 the composition of the debt was drastically concentrated in loans in currency. The 
fact that in 1969 the loans where not mainly concentrated in loans in currency category meant 
that the Brazilian debt was not contracted mostly from private international banks – as it was the 
case in 1975 – and that a significant part of it was held from governmental institutions. This was 
a better scenario because it gave Brazil a possibility of renegotiating the debt with governments, 
in a relationship from sovereign nation to sovereign nation, instead of having to deal with private 
banks – as it became to be the case in the 1980s. 
The composition of the debt that was market by foreign currency loans starting in 1968 
was completely distinct from previous periods. As Pereira argues, from the end of the Second 
World War until 1968, the foreign capital influx to Brazil was mainly composed of import 
financing, direct investments and compensatory capital; during this period international currency 
loans were practically inexistent
66
. While in 1966 53 percent of foreign capital that the industry 
absorbed were import financing, as of 1968 currency loans became predominant: 79 percent of 
the capital flows registered in 1971 were foreign loans
67
. 
As Table 1 shows, in 1975, 68.7 percent of the total debt that was registered in loans in 
currency, of which 17.6 percent was coming from loans registered through Resolution 63, and 
50.9 percent came from loans registered through Law 4.131. This shows that by 1975, 68 percent 
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of the Brazilian total foreign debt was lent by private institutions. During the 1970s, when the 
indebted were still able to roll over this debt, this would not be a problem. However, this would 
become problematic during the 1980s, after the US Federal Reserve Bank president Paul Volcker 
increased drastically US interest rates, which made the Brazilian debt with the international 
private markets triple in its value.  
Diagram 1: Brazilian Foreign Debt (1969 and 1975)
 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil março 1976, v.12, n. 3, Brasília 
  
The international banks of US origin were predominant among the lenders, and were 
responsible for 29 percent of the lending in 1968 and 35 percent in 1971. The United Kingdom 
banks followed the North-American banks (lender of 13.5 percent of the Brazilian debt in 1971), 
France (9 percent in 1971), and then came the German banks (7.3 percent in 1971), and the 
Belgian banks (6.5 percent in 1971)
68
. In addition, during the period of the “economic miracle” 
the main borrowers in the industry sector were the chemistry, mechanics, electric material,  
communication, and transportation sectors
69
.  
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 2.3 Private versus Public Borrowing 
 The role of BNDE in the Brazilian indebtedness was important, as it guaranteed the 
foreign borrowing by public and private firms. Frieden claims that between 1968 and 1973, this 
state bank intermediated an average of $90 million a year. During the years 1974 until 1980 this 
average increased to $500 million a year
70
. The BNDE became fundamental to channeling 
foreign currency into the Brazilian industry and it was responsible for 80 percent of the industrial 
lending during this period
71
. 
 Even though public borrowing increased drastically during the 1970s, as it will be 
discussed in the next chapter, the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s was marked by 
the high rates of private firm borrowing. More than just private borrowing, however, what 
marked the period of the Brazilian “economic miracle” was that the multinational companies in 
the country were responsible for 54 percent of the foreign loans
72
. Pereira’s study for IPEA  or 
Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social), which covers only the first phase of the 
borrowing period we are studying here, discusses that the multinational firms situated in Brazil 
were the main institutions responsible for the Brazilian debt. He argues that a high increase of 
the indebtedness in the industrial sector could be observed amongst the foreign firms, that in 
1966 were responsible for 44.2 percent of the total debt acquired, and that in 1971 were already 
accountable for 60 percent of the debt
73
. 
 Davidoff Cruz explains that the foreign credit was so appealing to the big enterprises 
during this moment of Brazilian economic development because of some specific reasons
74
. First 
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of all, it represented a good option for long-term borrowing – something that the internal market 
was not able to do. Secondly, it represented a relatively low-cost form of credit. In addition, the 
author claims that the subsidiaries of great enterprises received additional benefits because they 
had the option of borrowing from abroad through preferential interest rates obtained directly by 
their headquarters in the Euromarkets, and because there was a greater permissiveness of the 
legislation regarding profit remittances for loans, they could, and did, substitute substantial 
volumes of direct investment for loans from abroad. 
 Jeffry Frieden argues that most of the private borrowing was done by multinationals, 
“who made gross borrowings of nearly $15 billion between 197  and 198 ”. In addition he states 
that this value was much larger than the sum of the foreign direct investment in the period, which 
indicates how important the foreign loans were with the Euromarkets. Regarding the domestic 
private firms, the author says that they borrowed about $3.5 billion gross between 1972 and 1980 
under Law 4131, but that most of their investment financing came from the BNDE or from 
private banks that lent capital through Resolution 63
75
. 
The public sector, in its turn, was accountable for 46.4 percent of the total debt in 1966, 
but for only 13 percent in 1968, and 3.9 percent in 1971
76
. Regarding the public sector’s 
borrowing, it is important to remember here that in 1966 Brazil had been borrowing mainly from 
foreign state agencies, especially from the US government. In other words, the 46.4 percent of 
the debt for which the public sector was accountable was not mainly lent by the international 
private banks, but by international entities.  
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES TO THE 
BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
 
During the mid-1970s the international scenario of credit abundance would change. The 
international crisis that was marked by the first oil crisis and the crisis of the dollar-gold standard 
would influence a change in the supply of resources of the Euromarkets and would result in the 
end of the Bretton Woods agreement. As Lima argues, the abrupt change of the relative prices of 
the main commodities, allied with the crisis of the international monetary system provided the 
basis for the eruption of the first crisis of the Euromarkets
77
. The real growth rates of the 
Eurocurrency markets, regarding the supply of liquid resources, decreased from 36.8 percent in 
1973, to 21.1 percent in 1974, and it reached 6.5 percent in 1975
78
. 
Celso Furtado claims that this was probably one of the only times in history when a 
central international change gave prior notice, for the quadrupling in the oil prices “was more 
than herald for the bad times that were about to come”79. Even though the scenario was of 
international economic crisis, the Brazilian military government, now under the presidency of 
Ernesto Geisel, would not respond by accepting the fact that Brazil would start to face lower 
rates of economic growth. Even though the economists from the Geisel administration probably 
knew that the international scenario of economic instability would affect Brazil negatively, their 
rhetoric that the Brazilian economy was an “island of tranquility amid a stormy sea”, and would 
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respond to the crisis with accelerated growth
80
. This government not only did not believe the 
international crisis would affect Brazil; it also counted on the continuance of the foreign loans to 
implement a new and ambitious economic plan. 
Geisel believed that in the course of the Brazilian industrialization, gaps in the industry of 
basic inputs and capital goods were established. The Second Plan of National Development (or II 
PND) was then created to change the priorities of the Brazilian industrialization. If during the 
years of 1968 until 1973 the expansion was grounded on the growth of durable consumer goods, 
now the expansion would be based on the orientation that the economy should grow drawn by 
the sector that would produce the means of production. In this rearrangement of priorities basic 
industry – which involved the steel mill, the metallurgy of nonferrous metals, the basic 
chemistry, mining, and heavy electronics – and the production of equipment and machinery 
would become the leading sectors
81
.  
The II PND was extremely ambitious, and even unrealistic; its idea was to maintain the 
growth rates achieved during the period 1968-1973 and preserve the high rates of export 
increase, and, at the same time, promote a radical rearrangement of industrial priorities
82
. It 
proposed that steel production would reach 18 million tons by 1980, when the country had taken 
fifty years to reach the production of 7 million tons of steel in 1974. In addition, the production 
of aluminum and zinc should increase from 100 tons to 300 tons, and from 15 thousand tons to 
100 thousand tons, respectively, during the same period. The capital goods industry should also 
double by 1980, and the imports of machinery should decrease from 52 percent to 40 percent of 
                                                        
80
 Cruz,                                      48. 
81
 Lessa, “Vis o crítica do II PND”, 5 . 
82
 Lessa, “Vis o crítica do II PND”, 5 . 
    
 
 37 
total machinery by 1978. The expectations for exports were also high. Brazil should be able to 
export around 200 million dollars in machinery and equipment by 1978
83
. 
This ambitious project assumed that the foreign resources that had fueled the “economic 
miracle” would continue to flow towards Brazil after 1974. Because this project involved the 
gradual reduction of imports, access to the foreign savings would enable Brazil to become less 
dependent upon the central economies
84
. However, the international crisis proved to affect Brazil 
in several negative aspects. Already in 1974 Brazil would notice the consequences of the 
international crisis when, because of the increase in the oil prices, there was an increase of 
import prices, which led to deficits in the Trade Balance. Aiming to induce a decrease in the 
country’s imports, the government promoted a tight monetary policy that had the purpose of 
absorbing the “excess of liquidity” in the economy – a measure that would, from their 
perspective, cause a decline in the rates of imports
85
. The imports, however, were not the only 
cause for worry. Against Geisel’s hopes, other negative aspects of the mid-1970s crisis were the 
insufficient inflows of foreign resources to Brazil. The Banco Central press officers pointed out 
on September 1974 that in comparison to the first semester of 1974, they had observed a 
reduction in the foreign loans inflows to Brazil during July and August
86
.  
 During the years 1974-1976, the Brazilian Balance of Payments suffered current deficits, 
which accumulated to $ 10.5 billion for the three years. As Davidoff Cruz explains, this was a 
consequence of the deterioration in the terms of trade and the decrease of the Brazilian exports’ 
volume – which were both consequences of the crisis of the developed economies87. Regarding 
the imports, within only one year the value of the Brazilian imports doubled, going from $6.2 to 
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$12.6 billion between 1973 and 1974
88
. In the context of the II PND, the deficit in the trade 
balance was an even bigger problem because the foreign resources were not as available as they 
were previously. From 1974 the supply of foreign resources decreased, yet it did not cease 
completely.  
 Furtado claims that in 1974 the loans to the private sector experienced an expansion of 
59.3 percent. He claims that during the mid-1970s the problems in the balance of payments 
started to threaten the Brazilian economic policy, for the deficit in the trade balance started to 
decline, yet the onus of the interest rates and amortization of the foreign debt increased 
drastically. In 1974 the services of the debt were worth 33 percent of the value of exports; 
however, in 1977 this value reached 51 percent. For Furtado, this was evidence that this debt 
would bring very negative consequences to the Brazilian economy from which nobody would be 
able to escape
89
. 
Ultimately, the Geisel government failed in implementing the II PND. The reasons for 
the failure were not only economic, but also political. Aside from the decrease of economic 
growth, the absence of massive capital inflows that would enable the implementation of the Plan, 
the abandonment of certain investments that were programmed and not implemented, and rising 
inflation
90
, politically there were groups that were against the emphasis on the strengthening of 
the industry of capital goods and basic inputs. These were the producers of durable consumer 
goods. As Lessa argues, the change in priorities would “hurt the interests” of these strong 
sectors. In addition, already during the Geisel administration the discussion that the military 
should enter in a gradual process of re-democratization of its institutions emerged
91
.  
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3.1 The “Nationalization of the Debt” 
Knowing the circumstances of the international crisis, the multinational headquarters 
started to warn their subsidiaries to start getting rid of their debt in peripheral markets
92
. The 
national and multinational private firms, then, decided to slowdown their borrowing with 
international loans aiming for debt clearance. The problem was that the strategy of the private 
firms could harm the kind of economic model that was enabling Brazilian economic expansion 
since 1967: the debt-led growth. Therefore, the military felt the need to create a set of measures 
that aimed to encourage private businesses to continue borrowing from abroad. 
In order to encourage the private sector’s loans with the international credit market, and 
also aiming to prevent deficits in the balance of payments, the Brazilian Central Bank created 
two new measures in legislation: Circular 230 and Resolution 432. Circular 230 was created in 
1974. According to the circular, the banks authorized to function in foreign exchange – which 
were the banks operating through Resolution 63 – would be able to make deposits of any value at 
Banco Central do Brasil in the foreign currency correspondent to the resources from abroad that 
would not be employed in transfer operations
93
. By the depositor’s request the  entral Bank 
could return these deposits in two circumstances, if the depositor needed to pay debt 
amortizations and for transfers in the country
94
. This measure entitled the Banco Central to take 
charge of the interest rates that would be directly remitted from the banks to the foreign 
creditor
95
.  
In addition, the currency devaluations implemented by the Brazilian economic team to 
slow down inflation increased the costs of borrowing. Therefore, in order to protect the private 
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sector’s loans in foreign exchange, the Central Bank issued Resolution 432 in 1977, which 
allowed borrowers of foreign loans to deposit foreign currency in the banks that were authorized 
to function in foreign exchange
96
. These banks were authorized to deposit these loans in the 
Banco Central, and the deposits would be protected from current devaluation of the cruzeiros, 
for the Brazilian Central Bank would accept the responsibility for the exchange risk and the costs 
of the debt that would be paid to the foreign creditor
97
. Resolution 432 would, in theory, 
encourage the private sector to continue borrowing, for devaluations in the national currency 
would not lead to the increase of their debt, and the Central Bank would become responsible for 
the costs of the debt. The hope of the government was that both measures would allow certain 
stability to the contraction of new loans
98
. 
The problem, however, was that, contrary to what the authorities imagined, instead of 
using these regulations to continue borrowing with the international banks, these private firms 
were not motivated to continue contracting private loans and took advantage of these measures in 
order to speed up even more the process of debt relief. The private firms, and especially 
multinationals, which held most of the debt, started to deposit foreign exchange in the Central 
Bank, transferring the responsibility of the debt services to the Bank. By allowing this, the 
Brazilian Central Bank agreed to take over the firms’ liabilities in the form of foreign currency 
because it became responsible for all the costs involved in the debt contraction. The government 
understood this as an incentive for indebtedness, and the companies saw it as an opportunity to 
pay off their debt. The private sector not only reduced their debt by making the Central Bank 
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responsible for the debt services, but also shortened their borrowing
99
. This was the first aspect 
of the process entitled the “nationalization of the debt”, through which the public sector would 
gradually become the major contractor of the Brazilian external debt. 
The second aspect of the “nationalization of the Brazilian debt” can be explained by the 
increase of public enterprise borrowing. As explained by Cruz
100
, the public enterprises, which 
had already been induced to contracting foreign resources, received a new impulse to further 
indebtedness with the international credit markets. The first impulse to public firms’ 
indebtedness during the mid-1970s would be explained by the necessity of resources to fund the 
II PND. The funding model chosen by the military for the Plan, according to Cruz, privileged 
foreign credit, and the explanation for this rested on the thesis of the “gap of resources” 
previously discussed. For the government, the resort to foreign credit would generate reserves 
that were necessary bring equilibrium to the Balance of Payments
101
. In spite of the claim that 
the loans would be necessary for the implementation of the II PND, Cruz claims that the ultimate 
goal of the external resources was to generate foreign reserves in order to bring equilibrium to 
the Balance of Payments
102
. 
In addition, in 1977 the ministries were forbidden from resorting to the internal financial 
system to fund investment programs of subordinate organs and enterprises. The counterpart of 
these obstacles to internal funding was the authorities’ desire that these companies would further 
resort to foreign loans
103
. At this moment the public companies started to, indeed, increase their 
loans with the international credit market. With respect to the loans registered through Law 
4.131, for example, the participation of the public sector increased from 35 percent in 1974, to 60 
                                                        
99
 Cruz,                                    , 121. 
100  ruz, “Endividamento Externo e Transfer ncia de Recursos”, 1 5. 
101  ruz, “Endividamento Externo e Transfer ncia de Recursos”, 1 6. 
102  ruz, “Endividamento Externo e Transfer ncia de Recursos”, 1  . 
103  ruz, “Endividamento Externo e Transfer ncia de Recursos”, 7 . 
    
 
 42 
percent in 1978. The sectors that mostly increased their participation in the debt were the power 
sector and the steel industry
104
. Beyond being forbidden from resorting to internal sources of 
credit, the income of the public enterprises was also being threatened. The tariffs and prices of 
their services, which had been already suffering an intentional decline as part of a policy to 
combat inflation, suffered a new decrease in 1983
105
. Therefore, besides being barred from 
resorting to domestic credit, the public enterprise also suffered a decline in its income.  
Furthermore, Cruz argues that the public firms’ indebtedness operated in a way to 
privilege the interests of the private sector. The most interesting example that the author gives is 
that since the public sector was borrowing from foreign sources, the funds mobilized by BNDE 
were directed under the form of subsidized credit almost exclusively to the private sector
106
. 
While the public sector was borrowing from private banks from abroad, the Brazilian 
government was increasing the subsidies to the private sector – a policy that at during the 1970s 
was not necessary to safeguard the production or productivity of the private sector, and that 
would prove to be devastating for the country as a whole at the end of the 1970s and beginning 
of the 1980s when the Brazilian total debt reached the value of more than a hundred billion 
dollars in 1984. In addition, the author also argues that the nationalization of the debt constituted 
a strong instrument in which the private sector socialized the consequences of the crisis with the 
nation. In other words, when the state became responsible for the costs of the debt, the public in 
general also suffered the consequences of a debt that was held by the private sector and the 
particular firms that were indebted. The public funds were used in order to preserve international 
banking capital and specific fractions of the domestic private capital
107
. 
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Table 2 shows how during the first half of the 1970s the private sector was through law 
4.131 the main borrower of loans in currency. In 1972 the percentage of the debt that was 
concentrated in the hands of the private sector was of 75.1 percent, while the public sector held 
only 24.9 percent of the borrowing under Law 4.131. At the end of the period, however, the 
numbers completely changed, as the private sector held only 23.2 percent of loans in currency, 
while the public sector became responsible for 76.8 percent of this debt.  
 
Table 2: Loans in Currency (Law 4.131) 
Structure of the annual gross inflows according to the ownership of the capital’s holder (million) 
  1972 1973 1974 1975 
Discrimination $ % $   % $ % $  % 
Public 623.1 24.9 1130.9 39.7 1098 35.3 1900.9 50.4 
Private 1874.4 75.1 1718.3 60.3 2011.5 64.7 1872.1 49.6 
Total 2497.5 100 2849.2 100 3109.5 100 3773 100 
 
Table 2 (cont.) 
 
  1976 1977 1978 1979 
Discrimination $  % $   % $ % $  % 
Public 1953.3 51.1 2500.5 51.5 5317.4 60.2 6642.9 76.8 
Private 1872.7 48.9 2356.9 48.5 3511.5 39.8 2007.4 23.2 
Total 3826 100 4857.4 100 8828.9 100 8650.3 100 
 
Source: Records from the Fiscalização e Registro de Capitais Estrangeiros – FIRCE – from Banco Central 
do Brasil, In Cruz, 1999, page 115. 
 
For Cruz what was just described would be the first phase of the nationalization of the 
debt. The second phase would begin after 1979, when the public sector increased its debt with 
the international banks, becoming accountable for almost 90 percent of the debt hired through 
Law 4.131. The intensification of the international economic crisis would come after 1979, with 
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the second shock of the oil prices and the drastic increase of the US interest rates. Cruz claims 
that after 1979 the private sector took the most advantage of the measures Circular 230 and 
Resolution 432, where the Brazilian Central Bank assumed the responsibility for the exchange 
risk and the costs of the debt. From 1979 until 1984 the Banco Central do Brasil would be 
transformed into the main borrower of foreign resources
108
. Despite the continuance of the 
borrowings of the public sector from the private banks, however, the main reason for the increase 
of the Brazilian debt after 1979 resulted from the dramatic increase in interest rates. 
 
 3.2 Floating Interest Rates 
 To understand the second phase of the nationalization of the debt defined by Cruz, it is 
necessary to understand the conditions under which the Brazilian indebtedness with private 
foreign banks was held and what were the consequences of holding loans through these 
conditions after the deepening of the international economic crisis. From 1973 all the 
international private bank borrowing started being offered at floating interest rates, and from this 
date the adoption of floating rates was widespread. As Monica Baer argues, this increased the 
risk taken by the borrower, for any rise of the international interest rates could lead to a situation 
of financial instability. By the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, about 75 percent of 
the long- and mid-term Brazilian external debt was held at floating interest rates
109
. The 
consequences of this debt held at floating interest rates was that the international interest rates 
did increase drastically, and provoked an even higher increase of the Brazilian debt.  
In 1979, Paul Volcker, president of the US Federal Reserve System, in an attempt to fight 
inflation in the US, increased the US interest rates to levels never seen before in the country. The 
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IMF and its members had suggested that the US kept the dollar undervalued, and a new 
international monetary standard would emerge. However, the US would not allow it to happen. 
The dollar had been devaluing since 1971, and in a desperate measure to fight inflation and 
appreciate their currency, the US government decided to increase violently the interest rates. 
This policy did not only harm the peripheral nations, but the US itself, leading the country to 
economic recession
110
. However, it also caught the attention of the banks that were previously 
turned to the peripheral markets. As explained by Tavares, the increase of the interest rates by 
the  S and the international financial instability caused the bank system to “panic” and seek 
refuge in the large financial markets
111
.  
The US policy helped to trigger a severe world recession, which not only provoked the 
increase of the Brazilian external debt, but that also prompted a reduction of the demand for 
Brazilian exports, which caused a decrease in the export earnings. In addition, there was a fall in 
the terms of trade in Brazil, “which declined by 46 percent between 1977 and 198 ”112. On one 
hand, there was an increase in the import prices in 1979, especially as a consequence of the 
shock in the oil prices – a product that fulfilled an extremely important position in the Brazilian 
imports list. And on the other hand, there was a decline in the export prices
113
. 
In addition, the increase in the US interest rates influenced the dramatic increase of all 
international interest rates. Regarding the funds from the Euromarkets, US monetary policy of 
1979 caused an “upward spiral” of the Eurodollar interest rates that went from 8.7 percent in 
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1978 to 17 percent in 1981
114
. As a consequence, the Brazilian total debt and its service 
payments also increased, and the system of debt roll over that was being used got threatened. The 
banks would not continue to lend to an economy that risked to default, and that was not growing 
economically, for as it was already discussed here, the foreign banks looked for opportunities to 
enhance their profit rates at markets in potential growth. The international credit system was 
virtually “closed” for the indebted peripheral nations in September 198 115. 
 The diagram 2 below shows the proportions in which the debt grew throughout the 1970s 
and beginning of the 1980s. In addition, the comparison between the Brazilian total debt with the 
portion of the debt that was only loans in currency, which represents the firms that contracted 
private international credit through Law 4.131, Resolution 63, and Instruction 289, shows that 
the total foreign debt grew at almost the exact same proportion in which the loans with the 
private international banks increased. This shows the direct relationship between the increase of 
the total debt and borrowing from private international sources. 
Diagram 2: Brazilian External Debt (total vs. loans in currency) 
 
 
Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, Maio 1983, v.19, n. 5, Brasília 
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3.3 The Adjustment Policies with the IMF 
According to Skidmore, the collapse of the economic policies that were being 
implemented to prevent Brazil from drowning into recession was confirmed in 1982
116
. In the 
midst of this crisis, however, what worried the developed world was the risk of the indebted 
countries to default. Therefore, the debt had to be renegotiated in order to enable the indebted to 
gradually pay it, and the role of negotiation agent was given to the IMF, which treated the 
creditors as the ones that needed to be helped in order to receive the services of the debt. For a 
few months Brazilian authorities resisted surrendering to the IMF policies. However, that 
intention did not endure for too long.  
The Figueiredo government signed a “letter of intent” with the IMF in February 198  and 
the agreement with the international private banks was concluded shortly after
117
. The IMF letter 
committed Brazil to meet specific targets in fiscal and monetary policy, and in foreign exchange 
policy and tariff policy. To receive IMF loans, Brazil would have to reach “the agreed targets on 
the agreed schedule or convince the IMF to grant a waiver”118. The “adjustment” that Brazil 
would go through under the tutelage of the IMF involved obtaining surpluses on the trade 
balance, and promoting the tightening of its monetary, fiscal and wage policies. 
One of the aspects of the renegotiation of the debt, which would be intermediated by the 
IMF, was related to the relationship between the creditors and the indebted. Monica Baer claims 
that the creditors pursued two goals: to maintain ties with the indebted in order not to lose all the 
assets that they had invested, and to guarantee that the debtors paid as much as possible of the 
debt service. In order to achieve these goals, the creditors maintained a relationship with the 
debtors that became known as the short leash policy; the creditors would continue to provide 
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loans to the debtors, but only to maintain their ties
119
. These resources were not supposed to – 
and did not – fulfill the purpose of the previous loans. They were supposed to be scarce in order 
to prevent the debtors from enlarging their bargaining power and to force them to subject their 
economies to an economic adjustment program, which would enable them to pay the debt in a 
near future.  
Furthermore, the strategy of the creditors was to deal with each indebted country 
separately and individually in order to maintain the interests of the debtors as much distinctly as 
possible. Finally, the last characteristic of this relationship was the discourse of the hope of a 
way back to the market, in which the creditors tried to convince the debtors that if they adopted 
all the policies that were suggested by the IMF they would win their way back to access to 
voluntary credit
120
. However, the conditions under which foreign creditors would find the 
peripheral countries attractive did not depend on the adjustment policies. It depended, as this 
work discussed previously, on foreign capital seeking profitable opportunities in growing 
markets. And, at this moment, the financial markets that were most rewarding were the US. 
Another aspect of the renegotiation of the debt was the nature of the relationship between 
the creditors, who feared that debtors might form a group and gain bargaining power to 
renegotiate the debt, but they themselves formed a group in order to protect their interests. The 
group of the creditors presented themselves to the debtors as one block through the organization 
of bank committees. This annulled the divergences that existed between the larger and smaller 
banks, for the first ones were able to impose their policies of dealing with the renegotiation of the 
debt to the second. Furthermore, clauses that guaranteed the equal treatment of the creditors in 
the process of the renegotiation were created. On one hand, they forced all the banks to stay in 
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the process even if they wanted to give up on the renegotiation, and on the other hand, all the 
clauses stated that the creditors should all be given the same benefits and should not be treated 
differently by the debtors
121
. 
As already stated here, the International Monetary Fund became the agency responsible 
for managing the international debt crisis. This institution supervised the adjustment programs of 
each one of the indebted countries, and it supported the general interests of the private creditors, 
intermediating the renegotiation between the creditors and the debtors. One of the conditions 
required by the creditors was that the indebted start to implement the IMF adjustment policies in 
their nations before receiving new funds. If the IMF approved the implementation and results of 
the policies, the banks would continue to provide funds
122
.  
 In 1983 Brazil was able to reach a surplus in the trade balance worth of $ 6.5 billion, 
something that was possible because of an expansion of 8.5 percent in exports, but mainly due to 
a drop of 20 percent in the value of the imports. In spite of these significant numbers in the trade 
balance, the “recessive adjustment” brought from the IMF only made Brazil drown even more in 
recession. The Brazilian GDP dropped by 3.4 percent and did not improve inflation, which 
reached the annual rate of 211 percent. In addition, the foreign debt continued to increase 
dramatically, reaching $ 93.6 billion in 1983
123
. 
 In 1984 the trade balance improved due to the recovery of international trade, which had 
a positive impact on exports. In addition, the fall in imports enabled a $ 13 billion surplus in the 
trade balance. The current account showed a positive balance of $ 517 million. Internally, the 
expansion of exports, which was led by manufactured goods, allowed the processing industry to 
grow, which stimulated domestic demand. These results ended up preventing the complete 
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fulfillment of the adjustment program because the stimulation of demand put pressure on salaries 
to rise
124
. 
 In spite of the slight improvement of the economy during 1984, Brazil continued in a 
deep crisis during the 1980s due especially to the credit tightness that endured throughout the 
decade. The public sector’s savings disappeared by 1985 125 , and in order to fulfill the 
requirements imposed by the IMF, the Brazilian government had to subject its economy to 
spending cuts and successive policies of currency devaluation. While the public was trying to 
make the economy recover from a deep crisis, the private – and mostly the transnational portion 
of the private sector – was already freed from the consequences of deep indebtedness. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 After one decade of high rates of economic growth led by the aim to diversify the 
Brazilian economy through investments in industry, Brazil entered the 1980s drawn in an 
economic crisis that was overcome only in the present century. During the 1980s and 1990s the 
country not only had to solve the problem of the debt crisis, but also the extraordinary inflation 
that that reached the rates of 1,973 percent in 1989 and 2,477 percent in 1993. 
 The great liquidity of resources available through the international markets in the 1960s 
gave the military the hope for easy economic growth and the way out of underdevelopment. 
Even though there are economists today who claim the funds from the Eurocurrency markets 
were not being converted into investments in the productive sector in Brazil, but being used to 
buy government bonds and speculate about their appreciation, the military government team, and 
specially Delfim Neto, advocated for obtaining foreign loans because they argued they were the 
alternative to the absence of significant internal savings. These funds would allow the 
modernization of the Brazilian economy and the development of the industry.  
 Between 1968 and 197  the country’s economy grew at extraordinary rates and put 
Brazil in the position of one of the largest worldwide economies during this period. However, the 
international economic instability from the following years determined the decline of the 
borrowing from the private sector and the consequent fall in their investments, and proved that 
the opening of the Brazilian internal market to the Euromarkets stimulated the development of a 
model of economic growth that proved to be unsustainable. The period of abundance of inflows 
of capital to Brazil gave the country a great advantage. Because the nation was a target of the 
movement of capitals at the end of the 1960s, or, in other words, because the funds from the 
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Euromarket were expecting high returns on their investments in the Brazilian internal market, the 
nation could use this for their advantage. The interest of the foreign capital in the Brazilian 
economy suggests that even if the government had not created laws that allowed better 
opportunities for the foreign capital, this capital would have searched for ways of entering the 
national economy. However, instead of taking advantage of the fact that the foreign capital 
needed markets that would enable their appreciation and bargaining about conditions in which 
they would be able to operate, they just let this capital move freely and with very few conditions. 
Instead of relying on only the foreign resources for incrementing the internal savings, stronger 
regulations in the law about profit remittances, for example, could compel foreign companies to 
reinvest their profits in the Brazilian economy instead of sending these profits to their 
headquarters. 
 The eagerness of the military in pushing for economic growth at any costs led to the 
process of the “nationalization of the debt”. In the beginning of the 1970s, 60 percent of the 
foreign debt in Brazil was concentrated in the hands of the multinationals. When the state 
decided to foment the indebtedness of the private sector and this policy did not work in the way 
it was expecting, the state had to not only take over the liabilities of a debt that was mainly a 
responsibility of the private sector, but it also safeguarded the interests of a group that would 
stop its investments in the Brazilian market as soon as the crisis struck. The interests of a group 
of private investors were preserved to the detriment of the entire public sector and, consequently, 
the nation. When the state nationalized the debt it brought upon itself and upon the nation’s 
economy the weight of the debt. The Brazilian state got to the end of the 1970s holding almost 
77 percent of the Brazilian foreign debt hired through Law 4.131. In other words, the Brazilian 
state was responsible for 77 percent of all the debt held with private international banks. 
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At the end of the 1970s, as the Brazilian total debt had already accumulated to almost $50 
billion, the US Federal Reserve Bank decided to increase drastically the US internal interest 
rates. At this moment, the Brazilian total debt that was mostly held at floating interest rates 
severely increased, reaching the value of almost $ 70 billion in the end of 1982. Such a measure 
was devastating not only for the Brazilian economy, but for all of Latin America that had been 
building its economic growth with the private loans from abroad. After Mexico declared 
moratorium, foreign credit inflows towards Latin America stalled, for the international banks 
were afraid that the indebted would default. This led to the Latin American agreement with the 
IMF – made in order to enable the indebted countries to pay their debt – and to the end of the 
Brazilian development period. 
 The debt-led growth and the government’s reliance on the funds from the Euromarkets 
left the Brazilian economy extremely vulnerable to external conditions. After 1979, the increase 
of the international interest rates led to the risk of moratorium and the government subjected the 
power of decision over economic policies in the country to the IMF. Now, a country that had 
begun its industrialization projects in the 1950s looking for a way out of underdevelopment, 
wanting to diversify exports and, consequently, aiming to become less dependent on the central 
economies, was completely subject to the decisions of private international banks and the 
policies that would enable Brazil to pay the debt. After this period the Brazilian policy towards 
its economy would change completely and face a shift towards neoliberalism. 
 The study of the causes and consequences of model of debt-led growth chosen for the 
modernization of the Brazilian economy leads us to assert that this was not a sustainable model 
of growth. By choosing to use private funds from abroad in order to grow quickly, the Brazilian 
authorities failed to protect the country from possible scenarios of international instability.   
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